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1137 
THE EMPEROR’S NEW CLOTHES: 
CLOAKING AND DISROBING THE SUPREME COURT 
IN CARRESE’S THE CLOAKING OF POWER 
J. Scott Johnson† 
The Cloaking of Power: Montesquieu, Blackstone, and the Rise of Judicial 
Activism. By Paul O. Carrese. University of Chicago Press, 2003. 312 
pages.  $39.00. 
 
Paul Carrese argues in The Cloaking of Power1 that the roots of 
today’s activist judiciary can be found in Montesquieu’s The Spirit of 
Laws.2  He does so by tracing Montesquieu’s influence on 
Blackstone, Hamilton, Tocqueville, and Holmes.  While Justice 
Holmes is the chief villain of the book, the current Supreme Court 
is also criticized, especially concerning the Roe v. Wade3 decision 
and its subsequent modification in Casey.4 The problem for Carrese 
seems to be the loss of any conception of natural law or right 
reason as developed through the practice of common law judging.  
This loss allows our current courts and their apologists to engage in 
pure partisan politics.  The big bugaboo in his eyes is, of course, 
Bush v. Gore.5  The question really is whether this is the exception 
that proves the rule or the best example of partisan rule itself.  
Carrese prefers the former, as do I, but he seeks to ground his 
argument in historical texts that simply can’t support what he is 
trying to do.  While there are many interesting insights offered in 
this book, Carrese’s argument is ultimately unpersuasive as it twists 
its texts in order to make points that cannot be reached with a 
 
 †  Associate Professor of Political Science, Saint John’s University and the 
College of Saint Benedict. 
 1. PAUL O. CARRESE, THE CLOAKING OF POWER: MONTESQUIEU, BLACKSTONE, 
AND THE RISE OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM (University of Chicago Press 2003). 
 2. BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, CHARLES DE SECONDAT, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS 
(Thomas Nugent trans., J.V. Pritchard rev., University of Chicago Press 1952) 
(1748). 
 3. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 4. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 5. 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
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straightforward reading. 
Carrese’s book is organized into three parts.  The first and 
longest section discusses Montesquieu’s The Spirit of Laws.  The 
second part investigates Blackstone who cribbed much of 
Montesquieu in his own evaluation of the English constitution.  
The third and final part quickly reviews the influence of 
Montesquieu on Hamilton, Tocqueville and Holmes, while carrying 
out the more important part of making Carrese’s own argument 
concerning the role of the judiciary in American politics.  In this 
review I will concentrate primarily on the first and third parts of 
Carrese’s project. 
The first problem with this book, and it is a common one in 
political theory, is the lack of an adequate literature review.  
Political theorists seem to believe that the field is not cumulative; 
nothing can be learned from what went before; each interpretation 
can and should reinterpret the text as if nothing before really 
mattered and whatever is presented is a new finding.  This is 
troubling since it is often the case that previous scholars have 
found insights that must be considered even if they are eventually 
countered by a better interpretation of the available evidence. 
In a brief two pages, Carrese dismisses most previous work, 
often mentioning authors only in the footnotes.  He ends his quick 
tour by stating, “[s]till, most readers of The Spirit of Laws have not 
found this distinctive conception of subtle judges and a judicialized 
liberalism.”6  If this is true, and I think it is, though not for the 
reasons given by Carrese, then it is incumbent upon the interpreter 
to defend the method of discovery as well as its fruits.  Why haven’t 
most other readers found this novel insight of Carrese’s?  I suggest 
that they haven’t found it because it isn’t there. 
Certainly Montesquieu makes brave claims for the consistency 
and unity of design in The Spirit of Laws.  But it is also well known 
that Montesquieu worked on the manuscript over twenty years as 
he was steadily going blind.  Carrese quotes “the encyclopedist 
d’Alembert: that one ‘must distinguish apparent disorder from real 
disorder’ and that ‘voluntary obscurity is not obscurity.’ ”7  This 
invites “an intricate, hardly obvious reading of his works” according 
to Carrese, as well as a “reading between his lines.”8  Maybe, maybe 
 
 6. Carrese, supra note 1, at 16. 
 7. Id. at 5. 
 8. Id. at 5, 16. 
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not. 
One possibility is that Montesquieu exaggerated his ability to 
keep the book together.  This possibility cannot be dismissed 
altogether.  A second possibility is that Montesquieu has invited us 
to play a game of blind man’s bluff, hunting for clues when much 
of the game is really in plain sight.  This book was placed on the 
Index of Forbidden Books in 1751, a mere three years after 
publication, so the dangers of censorship and persecution cannot 
be ignored.  The final possibility, and a favorite of postmodern 
critics, is to read the text as they choose to, finding what they will 
regardless of what Montesquieu might or might not have intended.  
This last possibility really shouldn’t be called interpretation and it 
seems to be what Carrese occasionally engages in. 
While Carrese’s approach is ideologically conservative, his 
method has much in common with the distorted readings of some 
postmoderns.  His method, like that of Leo Strauss, notices the 
number of citations to particular authors,9 the number of chapters 
in a book,10 the changes in a turn of phrase,11 and from these 
“clues” extracts dramatic conclusions.  One quick example is on 
page 100 where Carrese mentions an erroneous citation, 
“ ‘Aristotle, Republic, Bk 5, ch. 3.’  In fact, this discussion occurs in 
the corresponding book and chapter of the Politics12 and this is the 
only time that Montesquieu misnames Aristotle’s main work of 
political science.  This may signal his attempt to replace Aristotle as 
the teacher of true prudence . . . .”  While he softens his inference 
with a “may,” the evidence is still too slim to support that 
conclusion.  This may simply be the error of a man too blind to 
proofread his own text.  An earlier breathless conclusion drawn 
from similarly meager support is patently absurd.  Carrese writes, 
“[n]ever in the work does Montesquieu declare legislative or 
executive power so singularly essential to a liberal constitution, nor 
so important for individual security or liberty.”13  Imagine any 
constitution without either a legislative or executive power, and the 
naive absurdity should be obvious.  In both cases, Carrese overstates 
 
 9. Id. at 55. 
 10. Id. at 85. 
 11. Id. at 87. 
 12. ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS (T.A. Sinclair trans., Trevor J. Saunders rev., 
Penguin Books 1992) (335). 
 13. Carrese, supra note 1, at 6 (emphasis added). 
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the inferences that can be drawn from the evidence.  I do not think 
it is his method that is to blame. 
While the method Carrese uses can be quite powerful in the 
right hands, revealing things that a casual or quick reader might 
miss, it is incumbent upon the practitioner of this method to be 
doubly sure that he or she makes no obvious mistakes or the 
method reflects back on its user and forces us to wonder whether 
the mistake was intentional thus revealing a more secret purpose 
instead of a simple accident.  For example, Carrese quotes Locke 
and writes, “[t]his by itself raises the prospect of revolution, in 
which ‘[t]he People shall be Judge’ after all, but this puts everyone 
back in the state of nature.”14  Here he simply misreads Locke.  No 
plausible interpretation of Locke can suppose that it is ever 
possible to return to the state of nature. When the State fails, the 
power reverts to the people as a community, not to them as 
individuals.15 It is difficult to reconcile this and other small errors 
made by Carrese with the weight Carrese puts on the mistakes of 
Montesquieu. 
Turning to the main theme of the book, Carrese writes that 
“Montesquieuan constitutionalism reflects some debt to the 
founder of political science and constitutionalism, Aristotle, who 
simultaneously teaches the importance of natural right and the 
soundness of dividing regimes into distinct functions—the 
deliberative body, the offices and the law courts.”  Though earlier, 
like most everyone else including the Founders, Carrese gives 
credit for the separation of powers to Montesquieu.16  I have often 
wondered why more has not been made of this odd attribution.  It 
could be that many do not recognize the difference between 
separating the powers of government and checking and balancing 
those powers. 
Carrese, in laying out Montesquieu’s distinctive approach to 
the separation of powers, clearly shows how Montesquieu begins 
with Locke’s tripartite division of legislative, federative, and 
executive powers before splitting the executive power into 
punishing crimes and judging disputes.  Carrese notes how the 
federative power then falls out of consideration in order to 
 
 14. Carrese, supra note 1, at 24. 
 15. JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 123-24 (C.B. 
Macpherson ed., Hackett Publishing 1980) (1690). 
 16. Carrese, supra note 1, at 260. 
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redefine executive power and emphasize the importance of a 
judicial power independent of both the punishing and the 
legislative powers.  He shows how “Montesquieu then refines his 
formulation a final time, defining the powers as ‘that of making 
laws, that of executing public resolutions, and that of judging the 
crimes or the disputes of individuals.’ ”17  This is a great strength of 
Carrese’s exposition. 
What Carrese does not adequately emphasize is that the first 
formulation is Locke’s, the second more appropriate for criticizing 
the English constitution, while the third has the greatest 
applicability toward reforming French absolutism, which for 
Montesquieu was a deformed or despotic version of the ancient 
French constitution.  I think Carrese, given his method, could 
clearly have emphasized the reasons for this tortured approach.  
Despots do not take criticisms easily, so the true weight of the 
attack must be lightened.  Only a careful reading will notice the 
shifts and understand their significance.  A quick reader might 
simply miss Montesquieu’s shifts or blame them on Montesquieu’s 
own supposed carelessness. 
The main point of these tripartite divisions is, as Carrese 
correctly points out, the emphasis on the power of judging as 
separate from that of legislative or executive power. One of 
Montesquieu’s greatest complaints was of Louis XIV’s emasculation 
of the parlements, and he did have to make those criticisms subtly.  
While Carrese is correct to note Montesquieu’s insistence on the 
rights of “enregistrement and remonstrance,”18 he does not adequately 
discuss their diminishing historical importance.  Montesquieu, by 
referring often to Louis IX’s reign, was seeking to reverse history.  
The parlements could slow the executive power in France where 
there was no independent legislature, but that power was quickly 
disappearing.  There was a new need for an independent judiciary 
in France, and England provided some possibilities. But 
Montesquieu was also criticizing England’s prerogative courts, 
which were abolished in 1641, and the role of the House of Lords.  
In order for the courts to have any power to check the legislative or 
executive powers, the courts must first be separated from each of 
the other two. 
Carrese quotes Montesquieu as follows: 
 
 17. Id. at 46. 
 18. Id. at 32. 
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The power of judging ought not to be given to a 
permanent senate, but ought to be exercised by persons 
drawn from the body of the people (as at Athens), at 
certain times of the year, in the manner prescribed by law, 
to form a tribunal which only lasts as long as necessity 
requires. 
In this fashion, the power of judging, so terrible among 
men, being attached neither to a certain estate, nor to a 
certain profession, becomes, so to speak, invisible and 
null.  People do not continually have judges present to 
their view; and they fear the magistracy, not the 
magistrates.19 
From this, however, Carrese concludes that “Montesquieu 
appears to use juries not only to cloak the judging power but also to 
cloak professional judges.”20 The second part of his conclusion does 
not follow from the text. 
While the text clearly mentions juries, it explicitly rules out “a 
certain profession,” thus professional judges are not cloaked, they 
are excluded.  This is also a critique of the parlements, which 
belonged to a certain estate or class.  Perhaps Carrese is trying to 
make sense of how the institution of courts might survive without a 
set of functionaries to organize and supervise the juries.  What does 
a judge do, if the jury is doing the judging?  This is an important 
question to which no answer is forthcoming.  In this part of the 
book Carrese seems more concerned with explaining Monte-
squieu’s quarrel with Machiavelli concerning the use of courts by 
the people to promote their factional disputes with the nobility. 
In order to limit the factional temptation “Montesquieu 
indicates the first limits that should be placed on popular judging.  
If ‘the tribunals ought not to be fixed,’ the judgments certainly 
should be, so that ‘they are never anything but a precise text of the 
law.’ ”21  Even while quoting Montesquieu’s main points, Caresse 
seeks to evade them such that, by the end of this part of his book 
Carrese claims, “[t]his obscure discussion at the close of The Spirit of 
Laws suggests that a general principle of moderation or balance, 
one avoiding small minded extremes, should be used to formulate 
 
 19. Id. at 48. 
 20. Id. at 49. 
 21. Id. at 49-50. 
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not strict judicial policies but judicial maxims or rules of thumb.22  
It is hard to reconcile Montesquieu’s call for a “precise text of the 
law” with what Carrese endorses as “judicial maxims” or “rules of 
thumb.”  Montesquieu’s limits are far more precise than those of 
Carrese.  Indeed, it would seem more likely that activist judges 
would prefer Carrese’s formulation to that of Montesquieu. 
In the last few pages of this section Carrese makes much of 
Montesquieu’s failure to cite Coke.  Instead, “the only reference to 
a common-law text or author” is to Littleton, Coke’s predecessor.23  
Here Carrese tries to equate what Coke and Littleton do with “the 
kind of judicial depository advocated throughout” The Spirit of Laws.  
Common-law textbooks are clearly not the kind of depository 
Montesquieu preferred.  The parlements did not convert the 
common law decisions into code law, though they did provide an 
independent record of monarchical decrees.  That alone provided 
a check on monarchical power. These texts of Coke and Littleton 
reduce the multiform complexity of the common law into the kind 
of maxims that Carrese prefers but not the specificity that 
Montesquieu advocates. This confusion of the black letter 
restatements with the detail of the common law is a mistake non-
lawyers are particularly prone to make. 
The conclusions to be drawn from part one are elaborated 
more clearly in part three. Here again, as in part one, Carrese 
makes unusual interpretive choices. When discussing Publius, the 
“author” of the Federalist papers, Carrese only reluctantly 
distinguishes Hamilton’s contributions from those of Madison and 
Jay.  Indeed, by interpreting them all as if they have but one author 
he significantly distorts the differences among them. When 
discussing Tocqueville, Carrese’s emphasis on a legal aristocracy 
leaves entirely out of the discussion “How An Aristocracy May be 
Created by Industry.”24 I also believe he overemphasizes the 
influence of Holmes on legal realism, at the expense of Justice 
Brandeis, Justice Cardozo, or Karl Llewellyn.  It would be better to 
describe Holmes as a legal positivist, even though the terms have 
much in common. 
Carrese is aware that “[t]he brief analyses of Hamilton, 
 
 22. Id. at 99. 
 23. Id. at 103. 
 24. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 555-58 (J.P. Mayer ed., 
George Lawerence trans., Harper Row 1969). 
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Tocqueville, Holmes, and the late-twentieth-century Supreme 
Court . . . are, if taken individually, inadequate treatments of 
complicated and controversial topics.”25  He hopes that taken 
together they will allow him to raise questions about the legitimacy 
of judicial review and the pressures of democratization that led to 
“immoderate repudiations of natural right, a stable 
constitutionalism, and the separation of powers.”26  Holmes is the 
villain because “[h]is project to redefine law epitomizes . . . 
philosophical and constitutional immoderation by claiming to 
uncloak the real nature of politics and judging.”27  Here is the crux 
of the issue: Is Carrese more concerned with the power of judging 
or the fact that we now all know it is there?  Given the multiple 
references to cloaking, I believe he is more concerned with the 
revelation of that power and the poor interpretation that many 
have given to that revealed power.  If the power of the Court to 
decide the law is a power that is in some ways legislative, and it 
always has been, then what limits can be put on that power?  For 
Carrese the only response to this uncloaking must be a return to a 
natural law jurisprudence imposed on a democracy by an 
aristocratic judiciary trained through an experienced application of 
right reason that we call common law.  I do not think Carrese can 
adequately support that return. 
Part of the problem is that Carrese does not adequately 
understand the binding character of positive law that legislatures 
make, regardless of natural law.  Carrese seems to see this when he 
writes that “for Holmes, law is the posited will of the dominant 
forces of the community at a given moment.”28  This law is made by 
legislatures and may trump the common law made by courts, 
especially in a democratic system.  When Carrese quotes Holmes’s 
dissent in Jensen,29 “I recognize without hesitation that judges do 
and must legislate, but they can do so only interstitially; they are 
confined from molar to molecular motions,”30 he doesn’t consider 
the full case, but rather Holmes’s correspondence with Laski.  At 
issue in the Jensen case was exactly the type of separation of powers, 
 
 25. Carrese, supra note 1, at 181. 
 26. Id. at 183. 
 27. Id. at 231. 
 28. Id. at 240. 
 29. Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 30. Carrese, supra note 1, at 239. 
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here a states’ rights federalism to fill in by legislation what Congress 
has not decided, that Carrese seems to support.  The Court in a 5-4 
decision, over Holmes’s dissent, invented a remedy to reverse a 
state court decision requiring a railroad to pay a workmen’s 
compensation claim.  Holmes clearly stated later in his dissent: 
The common law is not a brooding omnipresence in the 
sky but the articulate voice of some sovereign or quasi 
sovereign that can be identified; . . . It always is the law of 
some State, and if the district courts adopt the common 
law of torts, . . . they thereby assume that a law not of 
maritime origin and deriving its authority in that territory 
only from some particular state of this union also governs 
maritime torts in that territory,—and if the common law, 
the statute law has at least equal force, as the discussion in 
The Osceola assumes.31 
It strikes me as odd that Carrese does not realize that Holmes 
could serve as his ally. 
Instead he criticizes Holmes by introducing a “rule of thumb.”  
He argues that “today’s judiciary should not attempt ‘statesmanlike’ 
adjudications, since in the wake of the Holmesean revolution these 
most likely would be made without regard to the Constitution’s 
fundamental principles.”32  In support of this maxim he cites 
Lincoln’s “principled but prudent opposition to the constitutional 
authority of the Supreme Court’s Dred Scott decision”33 and later his 
own opposition to the “statesmanlike” adjudication in the abortion 
decisions, Roe and Casey.34  Clearly Dred Scott35 was a dread spot on 
our constitutional history (and only the second time judicial review 
was used to strike down an act of Congress).  While I tend to 
support the outcome of Roe, I agree that this, too, was an act of 
judicial statesmanship and not proper judicial decision-making.  
On the other hand, Carrese would do well to remember that 
Holmes dissented in Lochner,36 a key precedent for Roe and Casey, 
and was a fundamental critic of “substantive” due process.  As 
Justice Holmes wrote in that dissent, 
I think that the word “liberty,” in the 14th Amendment, is 
 
 31. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 32. Carrese, supra note 1, at 228. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. at 245. 
 35. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856). 
 36. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
9
Johnson: The Emperor's New Clothes: Cloaking and Disrobing the Supreme Cou
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2004
JOHNSON-FINAL.DOC 3/30/2004  11:42 PM 
1146 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:3 
 
perverted when it is held to prevent the natural outcome 
of a dominant opinion, unless it can be said that a rational 
and fair man necessarily would admit that the statute 
proposed would infringe fundamental principles as they 
have been understood by the traditions of our people and 
our law.37 
The Great Dissenter was dissenting against one of the very 
things that concern Carrese: unbridled judicial power. 
Carrese does not find an ally in Scalia’s dissent from Casey 
either, and for some of the same reasons that he rejects Holmes.  
Carrese condemns Scalia because he “adheres to such traditional 
legal authorities simply from a democratic skepticism about any 
others.”38  For Carrese, “[t]he severing of reason from tradition, of 
the rational use of precedent from the customary character of the 
law, explains why the Casey plurality has failed . . . .”39  He goes on 
to argue, “[a] historicist notion of judicial statesmanship prescribes 
an isolated, autonomous individual, while the positivist alternative 
lacks the deeper reasoning to counter th[is] pragmatic 
individualism.”40  Carrese’s attack on Holmes, Scalia and especially 
Rawls is part and parcel of what is really an attack on liberalism 
itself.  Liberalism, as we have come to know it, suffers from “a 
modern skepticism leading us to eschew any meaning or order in 
nature independent of the human will, any reality to the traditional 
distinctions regarding what is higher or virtuous in human life.”41  
Carrese prefers a “blend of natural rights and a traditional legal 
prudence . . . for counteracting the slide toward modern nihilism 
and individualism.”42  For this he needs “a genuine moral realism 
rooted in the reality of nature.”43 
Carrese never specifies exactly what the reality of nature might 
be or what a genuine moral realism might require.  Certainly his 
approach to natural law is not the modern reliance on reason, but 
it appears to be the more robust kind of Aristotle.  It would be 
appropriate to remind ourselves that Aristotle thought men were 
superior to women “by nature” and that there were “slaves by 
 
 37. Id. at 65 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 38. Carrese, supra note 1, at 248. 
 39. Id. at 249. 
 40. Id. at 248. 
 41. Id. at 253. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at 259. 
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nature.”  I hope this is not the reality of nature that Carrese prefers.  
Arguments from nature can ossify habit and prejudice rather than 
determining what is really essential to the human condition.  That 
is why opponents of the older versions of natural law remain 
skeptical and sadly why those who accept things as “natural” cease 
to argue about the truth of their assumptions. 
Carrese seems to be assuming that a quasi-aristocracy is the 
natural place for a judicial power44 and he does so by deferring to 
authority rather than truly making an independent assessment of 
what nature might require. 
A comparison between Holmes and either Hamilton or 
Tocqueville indicates that it is the classic common-law 
element in the framers’ jurisprudence, and not solely the 
Montesquieuan conception of judging, that provides this 
ennobling, quasi-aristocratic character to the original 
American conception of judicial power.  Holmes 
repudiates exactly this moral element of American law.45 
It is hard for those with republican sentiments to accept 
nobility as a moral element in America. 
Carrese begins and ends with an attack on activist judges as 
serving the ends of liberalism while destroying the separation of 
powers and majoritarian democracy.46  His case is made more 
clearly when “statesmanlike” judges attempt to enforce what they 
believe a majority would like instead of exercising judicial power 
interstitially, as Holmes recommended.  Carrese’s discussion of the 
Federalist fails to discuss the key contribution of Madison in 
Federalist 10,47 where he discusses the dangers of majority factions.  
If there is any last redoubt for the rights of individuals, it must be in 
the words of the Constitution and then in statutes interpreted by 
judges sometimes against the precedents of common law. 
Gay marriage, while not discussed by Carrese, is an obvious 
example.  Common law and long-standing tradition seem to 
preclude the state’s recognition of same sex unions.  Yet the plain 
wording of the Constitution’s equal protection clause,48 and other 
 
 44. Id. at 209. 
 45. Id. at 209-10 (emphasis added). 
 46. Id. at 1, 261. 
 47. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison) (Michael Kammen ed., Penguin 
Books 1986). 
 48. “No State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
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phrases in the Massachusetts and California constitutions,49 are 
being interpreted to trump those traditional understandings.  Is it 
activist judges or just plain meanings seen differently?  Some will 
say these unions are against nature, but the proper response must 
be that the unwritten natural law was not enacted by the people 
and it is far harder to understand an unwritten law than a written 
one.  Clearly there are unintended consequences of every 
enactment, but this does not reduce the force of those enactments.  
Common law judicial decision-making is essentially a process of 
determining what all the consequences of a particular enactment 
might be on a case-by-case basis, then allowing the legislative power 
in a separate body to respond or clarify if they so choose.  It is not 
an attempt to replace the legislative judgment. 
The movement to enact a constitutional amendment 
discriminating against homosexual unions is a more powerful 
response to current social changes than the southern states’ laws 
against interracial marriages that were ultimately struck down in 
1967.50  Both actions were activist attempts by supposed majorities 
to work their will against identifiable minorities.  One was stopped 
and the first has yet to play itself out.  If the attempt to add positive 
discrimination against a particular group into the Constitution 
succeeds, it will be a spot on our constitutional history every bit as 
bleak as Dred Scott. 
The Cloaking of Power is a useful book.  I cannot recommend the 
book as an excellent study of any of the authors it purports to 
interpret.  However, it defends and decloaks an important 
ideological current in American legal thought by outlining some of 
its origins in suspicious readings of Montesquieu, one-third of the 
authorship of the Federalist, and pieces of Tocqueville.  It outlines 
an aristocratic approach to the judicial power completely in line 
with the inegalitarian anti-homosexual movement now active.  For 
that reason, those who prefer a more liberal, limited, and positivist 
approach to judicial power will find much to argue with here. 
 
 49. See, e.g., Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). 
“Barred access to the protections, benefits, and obligations of civil marriage, a 
person who enters into an intimate, exclusive union with another of the same sex 
is arbitrarily deprived of membership in one of our community’s most rewarding 
and cherished institutions. That exclusion is incompatible with the constitutional 
principles of respect for individual autonomy and equality under law. Id. at 949 (emphasis 
added). 
 50. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
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